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Economic Equilibrium with Costly Marketing*
Duncan K. Foley
M.I.T.
1 . Intrqduc tion
The traditional theory of general market equilibrium, the most
famous rigorous presentation of which can be found in Uebreu [1], re-
mains the deepest scientific resource of economists, and is the basis
of the most sophisticated attempts to study a wide range of economic
problems. It is therefore disturbing that this theory, when applied to
the complete problem of economic interaction over time, space and in the
presence of chance, predicts the formation of numerous markets in time-
dated, place- tagged, contingent commodities which do not actually exist.
Corollary to this embarrassment is the prediction by the theory that
economic agents will choose one plan of action good for all time and
all contingencies, which they clearly do not.
The embarrassment does not come from the fact that the theory is
too weak, but because it is too strong. Its assumptions are general and
unexceptional but its conclusions awesomely specific. Confronted by this
* While writing this paper, I was a Ford Faculty Research Fellow. I
would like to thank Ross Starr for numerous helpful conversations on this
subject. Frank Hahn has independently developed a model very similar
in structure to the one presented here.
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problem, which has become acute only as an aftermath of the rigorous
mathematical foimulation of the theory, economists have tried to find
weak links in tne underlying assumptions. One such weakness is the ab-
sence from the theory of any real resource costs in information gather-
ing and processing, or in the operation of "markets".
It is my purpose here to outline a very simple modification of the
traditional model in which it is possible to analyze the consequences
of costs in the operation of "markets". I believe this modification
sacrifices none of the generality and rigor which make the theory of
general equilibrium so splendid. The modification does, however
,
drastically alter the stylized picture the theory yields. In particular,
markets will not generally exist in unlikely contingencies or for de-
liveries in the uistant future, nor will economic agents find it useful
or even possible to bind themselves to a single unchanging plan.
The key aspect of the modification I propose is an alteration in
the notion of "price". In the present model there are two prices in
each market: a buyer's price and a lower seller's price. The difference
between these yields an income which compensates the real resources
used up in the operation of the markets.
2 . Consumers and Demands
Each of n consumers has a consumption set X C E (since there are
m commodities) which defines the consumer's biologically and technically
feasible consumption plans. A point x z X includes provision of services
3)
and resources whicli tne consumer owns as negative numbers. On the set
X there is a preference ordering
'r. .
i'iic set a = X a is the aggregate consumption set. X is the
i
"attainable" consumption set for each consumer, the set of consumption
plans for the consumer that the whole economy has resources and tech-
nical knowledge to provide.
I will make tiie following assumptions about X and «r. •'
a.l) The aggregate consumption set X has a lower bound. (This
implies that each X also has a lower bound)
.
a. 2) For each i, X is closed and convex.
b.l) For every consumption x £ X there exists x EX
with x Ax. (This assumption asserts that the full
productive capacity of the economy is not sufficient to
satiate any consumer completely)
.
b.2) For every x £ X the sets
{x £ X | x r. x } and ix e X | x C. x ;
are closed in X .
b.J) For every x e X the set
{x c X | x K x } is convex.
c.l) c X for all i.
The consumer faces two sets of prices, p and p . (I will very
often write tt = p - p to denote the difference between these) . The
4)
cost of any consumption plan x will depend on the two vectors x ' and
x defined by:
i^
r
i ni
x . = max [ x
. , J
iS
• rim
x
.
= rain [x
. , OJ
x is the vector of purchases and x L the vector of sales. The
,- i i . li iii , S iS
value of a plan x is p x + p x
For any wealth w
,
the consumer is restricted to the set
1 , b a 1. r l ,1,1
(p , p , w ) = lx £ X /x =
iB
,
iS
c + x where p X + p < w ;
R S i
it is easy to see that if p. < p. for some commodity j the set B
is unbounded because any consumer can buy and sell commodity j at a profit
In what follows I assume always that p > p , that is, v > 0, and that
p
b
> 0.
In two dimensions, the consumer's budget set is the intersection of
two price lines (see Fig. 1).
A
Figure 1
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If every consumer has w = and chooses a point x with
B iii
,
S iS _ .,
,
.. t B B , S Sp x + p x =0, then in the aggregate, p x + p x = where
B v iB . S v iS . . B , S , B S N Li Sx = L x and x = L x
,
or writing z=x +x,(p -p)x = -p z.
i i
This observation is analogous to Walras ' Law, but has an inter-
esting interpretation. The vector z is a vector of net consumer supplies
B S
and demands to producers. At any p , p pair, consumers are willing to
release resources just equal in value to the total premium they pay through
higher buying prices. In a pure exchange economy without production, the
vector z represents resources used up in the operation of the markets.
It is possible to show that the budget set B is convex and then go
on to prove tiiat consumer demands in the two-price environment have the
same continuity and convexity properties that hold in the one-price en-
vironment. I prefer to proceed by a shortcut, and to show that the con-
sumer I have described is mathematically equivalent to another consumer
in a one-price economy who satisfies the assumptions made above.
This useful way of describing consumer choice in the txtfo-price
environment is suggested by writing the budget constraint as
S , 1J u . b S ji
p • X + (p -p)X = p "X + TT'X < W.
The selling prices are applied to the entire bundle, with a premium
for transactions at the buying prices. In fact, it is possible to define
a new consumption set X^C E and new preferences on this set r' by the
relations
:
a) X = { (x, z) | x e x , z. > max [x., 0] for j = l,...,m }
6)
b) if (x, z) and (x, z) £ X , tiien (x, z) ^' (x, z)
i
if x r. ' x in X .
1
it is easy to verify that if X and r. satisfy assumptions a.l),
a. 2), b.l), b.2), and b.3), then X and f. will as well. The indifference
curves in X will be thick, since the commodities z do not make the con-
sumer any better off. Fortunately equilibrium analysis is sophisticated
enougn to handle this situation (cf. Debreu [2]).
The key to proving that X and r. ' satisfy the other assumptions
made above is to snow that X is convex and closed if X is.
Theorem 2.1: if X is convex anu closed, then X is convex and closed.
Proof : First, take closure. Let { (x , z ) } * (x, z) be a sequence of
points sucii that (x
,
z
q
) £ X for all q. Since X is closed, x £ X ,
being the limit of a sequence contained in X . The only other condition
is that z. > max [x., 0] . Suppose for some j, max [x., 0] - z. > €, . For
large q, | x° - x. | < 6 , | z. - z. | < 6 , so that max [x., 0] - z. > t
,
which contradicts the assumption that (x , z ) £ X .
Next consider convexity. If (x, z) and (x, z) £ X , and
~
-
_ _
" ~ i
(x, z) = a (x, z) + (1 - a) (x, z) (0 < a < 1) , convexity of X implies that
x £ X . The problem is to check that z. > max [x., 0] for j=l, ,m.
J - J
~ ^ /•>
z. = a z + (1 -a) z. > a max [x., 0] + (1 - a) max [x 0]
J J J
-
J J
= max [ax., 0] + max [ (1 - a) x., 0]
>_ max [a x. + (1 - a) x., 0]
> x. O.L.D.
~ J
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The proofs that the X and f~' also satisfy the other assumptions
follow easily from this theorem.
i 5'C A
It is also true that if the new consumer chooses (x , z ) and
S* * N i* S*prices (p , it ) then the old consumer will choose x at p" and
U* s* *
p = p + TT .
i* * —
i
S* B*
Theorem 2.2: Suppose (x , z ) £ X satisfies for p , p > 0,
* B* S* s _
TT = p - p >^ 0.
S* i* A A £
a)p X + TT Z <_ W
, . , i* * N A i / i \ c 1 1 i i \ ~i . „, S* i . * . ib)(x , z ) r\ (x,z) for all (x , z) £ a with p x + tt z < w
i* 1
c) x c X
Then x £ X will satisfy
1 N S* i*S B* i*B i
a ) p x +p x £ w
,
1. i* i i i i s* is 13* iB i
b ) x r: x for all x e X with p x + p x £ w .
* i*B i* B 1.
Proof: Since z
.
_> x . = max [x. , 0] and p. ^ 0, part a ) follows
immediately from a)
.
~i „i .
,
S* "iS B* "IB „ iSuppose there existed x £ X with p x + p x £ w and
x
1
A. x . Then (x , x
u
) £ X by definition of X , p x + tt x £ w ,
~i ~iB r^ i* *
and (x
,
x ) '. ' (x , z ), which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
All the usual results of demand theory based on the assumptions
a .1), a. 2), b.l), b.2), b.3), and c.l can be applied to the consumer
with consumption set X and preferences v. ' and through him to an
8)
ordinary consumer in a two-price environment.
If the consumer's preferences can be represented by a utilitv
function u(x) , nis demand problem is the constrained maximization
problem:
max u(x)
subj topx+px<w
Tne first order conditions are:
3u/3x. - A p
b
= if x.>0
2 2 2
3u/3x. - A p. = if x. <
J J J
wuere A is the LaGrangean shadow price corresponding to the wealth
constraint, which depends on the prices.
Since p. _> p., these conditions can be written
p. £ (1/A) (8u/9x.) < p . , j = l,...,m where tlie left-hand equality
holds for x. < and the right-hand equality for x. > 0.
3 . Production and Marke ting
while consumers have no cnoice but to buy at the buying price and
sell at trie selling price in a market, at least some producers can in-
volve themselves in marketing activities, at a cost in real resources.
The production plan of a producer can be written (y , y ) , where y
is tne total net transaction the producer makes, and y the vector
of purchases and sales subject to the premium buying price. The profit
9)
arising from such a plan at prices (p'
, p ) will be:
J / S . S j Bj 13 S
71 (p » it) = P y + IT y where tt = p - p .
Some producers will do no marketing of their own, hiring re-
sources at the buying prices and selling their product at the selling
price. Other producers may do all their marketing in all markets,
hiring resources at the selling price and selling their output at ttie
buying price. The second procedure, of course, will require more re-
sources than the first, even if the total output is the same, if mar-
keting is costly. Other producers may do some transactions at buying
prices and others at selling prices.
What determines how much marketing a producer does for himself?
The producer will market if the spread between buying and selling prices
is large enougn to make it profitable for him. If the spread is small
a producer will prefer to leave the marketing to other producers.
If marketing activities were costless, there would be no spread
between buying and selling prices and the economy would be the same as
in the trauitional models
.
What are the costs involved in marketing activities? They include
the effort required to inform buyers or sellers of the existence of a
supply or demand for a commodity, and of the price. This may include
advertising, costs of holding stocks for wide distribution, spoilage,
breaking down commodities for retail sale, and product standardization
and certification. The important feature of these costs is that they
expend real resources without altering the characteristics of the de-
10)
! , 1livered product.
This is a copout
I assume that the set of feasible production plans for each pro-
ducer, Y
,
has the following properties:
d.l) E Y 3 for all j . (This assumption, together with (c.l)
assures that there are feasible allocations for the economy.)
d.2) There is no (y 3 , y
jB
) e Y3 with (y 3 , y
3B
) > 0. (This rules
out the possibility of free production or free marketing.)
d.3) Y is a convex cone for all j.
(If (p , y ) £ Y3 and (y 3 , Y3 ) £ Y 3 then
(a y3 + 3 y 3 , a p + £ y 3 ) £ Y 3 for a, [i > G).
The last assumption rules out any set-up costs or indivisibilities
in marketing activities. Many economists have argued that indivisibilities
are characteristic of marketing activities.
4. Equilibrium
It is easy to generalize the notion of general competitive equilibrium
to an economy with marketing costs.
Definit ion: A market equilibrium is a vector of prices (p , v ) , a
vector x £ X for each consumer and a vector (y , y ) £ Y J
for each producer such tiiat:
i* V i S* ••'
a) x is maximal with respect to ^ in b (p , it , 0)
b) p y
J + tt y
J
_> p y
J + tt y
J for all (yJ , y J ) £ Y J ,
j = 1 , . . . , k
.
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c) I (x , x ) - L (y J , y
J
) =
i j
d) p
S v
^ o, it'' > o.
In equilibrium, consumers are maximizing according to their pre-
ferences subject to the budget constraint, producers are maximizing
profit both in ordinary production and in marketing activity, and
all markets clear.
The easiest way to show the existence of such an equilibrium is
to study an extended economy witn 2m commodities, and apply to the
extended economy known existence theorems. The best such theorem for
ray purpose is contained in iJebreu [2]. I paraphrase that result here.
Theorem 4.1 [Existence of Quasi-Equilibrium]
An economy & defined by consumption sets X , preferences <? . , production
sets Y
, and a vector {0..} indicating the i consumers share of the
profits of tne j producer (if any) which satisfies assumptions a.l),
a. 2), b.l), b.2), b.3), c.l), u.l), d.2), and d.3) lias a quasi-equili-
brium ; that is, there exists ( (x
1
"), (yJ "), p' ) C ( (X ), (Y J ) , Lm )
such that:
i* >
a) x is maximal with respect to r in
ix e a p x < l . . p v } or
—
.
ii
J
* i* ... * i -
p x = Hin p X , for every i .
b) p y = Max p Y J for every j
.
c) i, x - l y =0
i j
u) p"^ 0.
12)
I want to apply this theorem to the economy with consumption sets
a
,
preferences £', production sets Y and an arbitrary vector (0 .
.
)
with 0.. > 0, HQ.. = 1.
1 J
This yields a set of consumption and production plans
i* ii i* Bi* S* *
( (x , z J ) , (y J , y J ) , (p , tt ) ) with the properties:
i* ±* —
i
v
a) (x , z ) £ X is maximal with respect to f:' in
{ (x , z )e X j p x + it z _< l 0. . (p yJ + tt y ) j or
j
iJ
p x + tt z = Min (p , tt ) X .
b) p y J + tt y •' = Max (p , TT ) Y J
c) Z (x
1
", z
V!
) - L (y
j *. y
hj
") =
i j
d) (p'''\ tt'"') i 0.
This is practically equivalent to the definition of market equilibrium
given above. To estaolisa complete equivalence 1 need to show that tt > 0,
and taat the profits of all producers are zero. The latter proposition
follows from profit maximization and the assumption that production sets
are cones. tt
_> follows from the unboundedness of X in the z -com-
ponents and assumption b.l), since if tt . < , a consumer could increase
z witnout limit anu aenieve a cons umpt ion outside X and preferred to X
J
This argument proves that a quasi-equilibrium exists with market
costs under tiie assumptions of traditional equilibrium analysis. The
most important restriction involving market costs is the assumption
taat marketing, like other productive activities, is not subject to
iacreasiiif; returns to scale or indivisibilities
.
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The difficulty that some consumers may in fact be at a minimum-
wealth point in their consumption set and not at a preference-
maximizing point remains. Debreu [3] notes that existence of a true
equilibrium, in which this situation occurs for no consumer, can be
assured by requiring that (a) the production set intersect the interior
of the aggregate consumption set and that (b) if any consumer is at
the minimum-wealth point in a quasi-equilibrium, all are. This theorem
carries over to the economy with marketing costs, because this model
is mathematically identical to the model studied by Debreu.
In some situations there may be difficulties in showing that the
requirement (b) above is met, because of the existence of the new arti-
ficial retail commodities . For example, Debreu defines an "always desired"
commodity as one such that every consumer can reach a preferred point
in his consumption set by increasing his consumption of that commodity
only. This will not be possible for bought commodities in the marketing.
costs model because increasing only that component of the consumption
bundle takes tne consumer out of his consumption set, unless the cor-
responding retail component is also increased.
With tae assumptions that each consumer can dispose of a finite
amount of all commodities, and that there are production activities
which produce every commodity retail using only wholesale inputs it
is possiole to saow that a quasi-equilibrium is a true equilibrium.
If any consumer is at the minimum wealth point in quasi-equilibrium,
all selling prices must be zero. hut at least one buying premium is
14)
therefore positive. but this situation contradicts the property of
profit-maximization in quasi-equilibrium, because there exists an
activity with positive retail output of the commodity with a positive
buying premium, and wnolesale inputs, which would give positive profits
iiecause I assume production and marketing sets to be cones, a positive
profit in any activity is not compatible with profit maximization.
able.
A stronger result than this is desirable and presumably discover-
1
Frank halm brought this difficulty to my attention.
5 . Pareto Optimum and the Co re
In a formal sense the traditional analysis of Pareto optima and
2
the core can be applied to the extended economy used above to study
2
See Debreu [1], Debreu and Scarf [3]
the existence problem. Hut I think to do this would be to travel too fast,
The essential notion in studies of Pareto optimal and core alloca-
tions is the set of allocations achievable in some purely technological
sense by a group of economic agents. In a pure exchange economy, for
example, feasible allocations for any coalition (or for the economy) arc
those which sum to the total endowment of the coalition (zero in the
present model since I measure all trades from the endowment point) . The
15)
introduction of market cost is intended to reflect information costs
involved in sustaining an allocation, but the assumptions made im-
plicitly refer to tne institutional environment, i.e. to markets.
it is not oovious tnat radically different organizations of exchange
would aave tne same type or magnitude of resource costs in tne ex-
change process. A deeper and more satisfactory study of the core and
Pareto optima would begin from a fundamental account of information
costs of exchange without references to institutions and derive ''markets'
as one of a number of possible organizations of exchange. Only in such
a theory coula the 'efficiency' 1 of tne equilibrium proposed here he
studieu otiier than trivially.
6 . Tne Lxiste i ice o f Markets
Lnder what circumstances will there be trade in a given market
at equilibrium with market costs? Put another way, when will the addi-
tion or elimination of a given market make no difference to equilibrium
prices or to any consumer's demand in any other market?
I will treat this proolem for a market in a commodity which is
not an input or output of prouuetion. Producers are not either buyers
or sellers of the commodity, but provide market services in the mar-
ket if it pays them.
In describing consumer equilibrium in section 2, I showed that
at tiie equilibrium traue to each consumer there corresponded a number
A
1 (in the case where consumer's preferences can be described bv a
16)
dif ferentiable ulilitv function) such that:
p. j< (1/A ) ( ju /3x.) < p
'
j = l,...,m.
If another market opens in a good not previously traded (but re-
presented in utility functions) an individual will not trade if the prices
d
, , , p , in the new market satisfy
ia + la + 1
at the original equilibrium demands. A large spread between buying, and
selling prices ensures that no consumer will trade.
troaucers , on the other hand, will De inducec by a large spread
between prices to expend real resources in providing market services in
the (m + l)st maricet. Suppose that A is the marginal cost at equilibrium
prices of expanding trading in the (m + l)st market. Producers will be
content with tne previous equilibrium only if
(2) ( + ll^l + A
If (1) nolds simultaneously for all consumers, then
(3) p
S
. < rain [ (1/A
1
) (Su
1
/ 3x ) ]
m + 1 — . m + L
l
W P^ + 1 > max [ (1/A 1 ) (SuX/^m + 1 ) ]
i
S 3
It will be possible to find p , and r> , satisfying (2), (3)
1 rm + 1 • m + 1
and (4) if ana only if
(5) L > max [ (1/A
1
) (3u
±/3x
m + J ] - min [ (1/A
1
) Ou1/^ + ± ) ]
17)
This, put in commonsense language, means that the difference
between the highest price at which any consumer woulu be willing to
buy and trie lowest price at which any consumer would be willing to
sell is smaller than the cost of bringing about the transaction. If
the (u + l)st commodity were an input or output in production these
conditions \/ould be modified to exclude producers' trade as well. The
highest price at which a producer is willing to buy the commodity
is the maximum of tne values of its marginal product to the producers;
the lowest price at which a proaucer will sell is the minimum of the
marginal costs of production.
In the case where the (m + l)st commodity is traded only by
consumers, a sufficient condition for uo trade is
(6) A > max [ (1/X
1
) Ou^x , .. ) ]
— in + 1
l
If the (in + l)st market is in a commodity dated in the far dis
tant future or a comiuodity in a contingency with low probability, its
marginal utility tfill be small because of time preference in one case, and
tne small contribution it maK.es to expected utility in the other. The
important idea here is that current actual resources are required to set
up a market in futures or contingent commodities. If the consumers value
these commodities little in relation to current actual resources, it will
not pay anyone to set up a market to trade them.
7 . An example
A simple numerical example may help to clarify tiie notion of
equiliorium proposed above. Suppose an economy exists in which the only
18)
goods are consumption dated at successive future dates, and that there
are two types of consumers with similar utility functions who discount
utility 100% per period:
u (c , c ,...,c ) = Z [ln(c. + w.)]/2 J where
j=0 J J
w. is the endowment of the i consumer in the Deriod i, and c is his
J
-
J
net purchase or sale of consumption in period j .
The demand functions for this utility function are well known. The
problem is to
m
max Z [ln(c. + w.)]/2 J
j
J 3
m
subj to Z p. c. =
i
2 2
The first order conditions are:
l/[2j (c. + w.)] - A p. = j = vj>, ,m.
or
1/[X(2J )] = (p. c. + p. w.) j =.0,...,m.
Adding these for all j
.
m
[L (1/2 J )] [1/X] =Ip. w., or 1/X = [I v. w.]/[Z (1/2J )]
j=0 j=0 J J j=0 J -1 j=0
Tnis gives the demand functions;
m
c ., = [(1/2 J )/Z(l/2 J )] [Z p w J/p , - w , j' = 0,...,i
J
j j=0 ] ] J J
For the case of tv/o markets (m = 1) the equilibrium price vector
19)
p = (1, 1/2), and the equilibrium demands are:
cj = 1/3 cj = -2/3 w 1 = (1, 2)
when
cj5 = -1/3 c 2
±
= 2/3 w2 = (2, 1)
If a market in period 2 is added the equilibrium price vector is
(1, 1/2, 1/4) and if w = (1, 2, 1.4) and w = (1, 2, 1.6) then
equilibrium demands are
c = .34 c
1
= -.66 c„ = -.06
2 2 2
c = -.34 c = .66 c = .06
The existence of tae extra market changes each type of consumer's
demand for goods in other periods.
Suppose now that trading a unit of any good costs .1 units of con-
sumption in period 0. The production set is a cone containing tne vectors
(-.1, 0; 1, 0) and (-.1, 0; 0, 1). In the case m=2, the cone contains
tue tnree vectors: (-.1, 0, 0; 1, 0, 0), (-.1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) and
(-.1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).
Tne consumer problem becomes
u
max L [ln(c. + w.)]/2J
j=0 J 3
subj to L p.c. + Z p. c. = c\ = min [c., 0]
c . = max [ c
.
, ]
The first order conditions become
i/[2J (c. + w.)] - A P
h
= if c. <
l/[2-i (c. + w.)J - X p
B
= if c. >
J J J J
These can be written
(l/2j ) (1/A) = p
S
c. + p
S
w. if c. <
J J J J J
(1/2J ) (1/A) = p^ c. + p
B
w if c >
Add up the terms which apply:
B
m m m p
(1/A) I (1/2J ) = Z -p. c
b
+ Z p c + Z ( \ ) w
j j-0 J J j-0 -1 J j-0 p* 2
b
p
i IS S >
where ( ) is p. or p. depending on whether c. < 0,
a j j J
j
The demand functions can be written:
B
P.
c
.
J
,
= [(l/2j ')/^(l/2j )] [Z( J )w ]/p
B
,
-w c, >0
J P
J
B
P,
= [(1/2J )/Z(l/2J )] [Z( J )w ]./p?, -w, c,<0
J P
3
In searching for an equilibrium with marketing costs I assume that
it will De sufficiently near the regular equilibrium that type 1 will be
a buyer in period and a seller in period 1 and vice versa for type 2.
21)
The problem is to clear the two markets. Clearly the relation between
buying and selling price in each market must be p. = p° + .In . Takinp
J J
p = 1, p = 1.1, p, = p., + .1, and the problem reduces to finding p
that will clear the period 1 market. Adding the demand functions where
w
1
= (1, 2) and w
2
= (2, 1):
c* + c
2
= [1/3(1.1 + 2p^/p^] - 2 + [l/3[2 + (pj H, . 1) ] /p J + .1]
- 1 =
This gives a quadratic equation in p' :
2
bp - 2.5p - .11 = with a positive root p = .457, implying p. = .557,
The demands are
cj = .22 4--,
c
2
= -.30 2 »C() = .53
It is instructive to compare this equilibrium with the one where
there was no trading cost. In the usual case the interest rate for both
borrowers ana lenders implied by the prices is 100%. With transaction
costs type 1 people, who are borrowers , face an interest rate equal to
(pj/p^) - 1 = (1.1/. 457) - 1 = 1.41,
i.e. 141%. The type 2 lenders, on the other hand, are receiving an interest
rate of only (p^/p^) - 1 = 1/.557 - 1 = .79, i.e. 79%.
To illustrate the point made in section 6, consider adding another
market in period 2 consumption, with w = (1, 2, 1.4) and w = (2, 1, 1.6)
The A multipliers implied by the previous equilibrium are A' = .745,
A
2
=
.588, and (1/A') (3u73c ) = .242, (1/A 2 ) (9u 2 /3c
2
) = .251. In this
22)
case A = .1, obviously, and the condition
i i i i
A > max [(1/X ) (3u /3x )] - min [ (1/A ) (3u /3x . .)]
.
niTi m + 1
is met since n = .1 >_ .251 - .242 = .009.
If in the new market the selling price is established at .2 and
tiie buying price at .3 neither consumer will want to trade and the
price differential will not be sufficient to draw resources into setting
up a market.
The implied two-period borrowing and lending rates can be found
by solving (1 + r^) = (p Q /p 2 ) and (1 + r 2 )
= (pQ/p 2 )
•
For the prices suggested above, the borrowing rate is 144% and the
lending rate 83%, in contrast to the equilibrium without market costs
where both rates are equal to 100%.
8 . Conclus ions
Although the model described above is logically consistent, it is
not as satisfactory in one important respect as the traditional model of
equiliorium wita futures ana contingency markets. Consumers and pro-
ducers in the traditional model have all the information they need to make
once and for all a complete consumption plan. There is no reason why they
should not simply exploit to the limit their trading opportunities at
equilibrium prices, then rest content and simply carry out their pre-
determined plan. If markets were reopened no trade would take place; the
equilibrium price system would remain the same. Given the environment
of the traditional model with full contingency and futures markets, there
23)
is no reason way a sensible consumer should not behave ar. the model
predicts
.
In the present model, however, prices will change when markets
reopen anu consumers know it. The reason is that the production sets
change with time in a particular way: it is not possible to use period
m resources in setting up markets until period in actually arrives.
In the next period, new markets will open and price spreads in other
markets will change. The consumer, then, has reason not to behave in
the way I have postulated, he may choose not to exploit fully his
tracing opportunities at this moment, ;;ut to defer some trades to the
future when other markets will exist and price spreads mav be more
favoraDle to him.
Another reason for changing prices is that some contingency which
everyone judged very unlikely may come to pass. Since no trade was done
in that contingency or any subset of it, the price spreads will be
large, initially. A somewhat similar problem of reopened markets arises
in Radner [4] where the problem is that new information changes some
consumption sets.
Thus consideration of marketing costs in this simple model leads
directly to the study of sequential trading. In these models there will
be both futures and spot markets, and the interaction of prices in these
various markets becomes the focus of interest.
24)
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